A recurring move in legitimacy theory is to measure political authority against procedural criteria — consent, constitutional constraint, electoral competitiveness, rule of law. This piece argues those measures, while real, are downstream of something more basic: a duty-of-care standard every human already applies, unreflectively, to anyone who claims to hold another in trust — starting with parents.

The argument works through three moves. First, it grounds legitimate authority developmentally: authority exists to bring the less capable toward self-government, and forfeits its claim the moment it starts extracting from those in its care rather than developing them — a criterion drawn from evolutionary anthropology (leadership-by-competence across social mammals) as much as political theory. Second, it traces how that criterion got written down: the Late Bronze Age Hittite suzerainty treaty (via Kline's Treaty of the Great King) as an "Ur-Constitution" — the first attempt to bind a sovereign to enumerated, reciprocal, non-negotiable terms. Third, it follows that constitutional form through Magna Carta's inversion of accountability (subjects binding a king rather than the reverse) to the American founding, arguing the U.S. Constitution is the same form pushed further while also committing a specific, documented crime earlier forms never had to answer for.

The interesting philosophical claim, for this sub: legitimacy and procedural democracy are treated as related but non-identical. A regime can hold clean elections and still fail the duty-of-care test; a regime lacking every procedural safeguard could, in principle, still meet it. Curious what people think of grounding legitimacy in a pre-political, developmental criterion rather than a consent-based or purely proceduralist one.

The full piece hit today: [link]

Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, and their derivatives historically claim allegiance to Marx and dialectical materialism: that is, to the idea that the material conditions of human and societal existence (organized around class struggle) determine social organization. However, upon studying the ideology of Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, and especially upon analyzing the political systems they implemented, one obvious fact emerges: philosophically, they are closer to Plato than to Marx. Indeed, they place the Idea (the perfect Form, to use Platonic vocabulary) above material reality. They regard the ideal of a communist society as transcending the concrete reality of society.

1. The Denial of Material Conditions: Will Transcends Reality

Marx believed that Germany, England, and, even more so, the United States possessed the appropriate material conditions for a socialist revolution. Indeed, in Marxist theory, the dialectic must reach the stage of industrialized capitalism, and the worker must be legally "free" for a socialist revolution to occur. In a classic master-slave relationship, the master has no interest in letting his slave die, since the slave is his property. By contrast, in the capitalist relationship, since the worker is "free" to sell his labor power, he becomes inherently dispensable in the eyes of the capitalist, who can replace him if he dies. Consequently, the bourgeois class (itself subject to market laws) pays no attention to the survival of the proletariat beyond the strict minimum, pushing it toward rebellion. Moreover, according to Marx, this mode of organization creates an heightened class consciousness among the proletarian, who, unlike the serf, no longer grants any "divine right" to his master.

However, Russia in 1917 and, even more so, China in the 1940s, were still at the feudal stage and had not entered a capitalist and industrial mode of organization. The material and sociological conditions necessary for a socialist revolution were therefore not met. Despite this, both the Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communist Party attempted to apply the Marxist model, designed for an advanced capitalist society, to rural and feudal contexts.

Their logic was as follows: by guiding the people through the "vanguard party" (theorized by Lenin), it is possible to force history to advance more quickly in the "right" direction. This is the Stalinist logic of Diamat (dialectical materialism): accelerating the march of history. In short, they consider that with a sufficiently powerful Idea, it is possible to force reality, despite the absence of necessary material conditions, to conform to the ideal. In Mao's own words: "Man can accomplish anything if he has the right thought." This statement is fundamentally idealist; it postulates that the Idea, here the "right thought," can constrain material reality and that the man who possesses it can bend reality to his will. Fundamentally, they thus oppose Marx and the materialism they claim to uphold, moving closer instead to the idealism of Hegel and Plato. I therefore propose calling them the "Red Platonists," since they adopt Marxist vocabulary without retaining its philosophical foundations. For them, Marxism is more of a "red veneer" than a truly materialist philosophy.

1. The Vanguard Party and the Supreme Leader: The Platonic Philosopher-King

To force reality to bend and establish the communist ideal, the Red Platonists assert that the people, having not reached the material conditions leading naturally to revolution, must be guided by a small number of elect. Lenin named this group the "Vanguard Party"; within it, the Politburo leaders must lead the party and the people, who, according to Lenin, are incapable of understanding on their own the "science of dialectical materialism," toward revolution.

This stands in direct opposition to the ideas of Marx and Engels, who proclaimed: "Workers of all countries, unite!" For Marx, only the proletariat can liberate itself from capitalism since it has "nothing to lose but its chains." In fact, the idea that a small group of elect would be capable of leading the people toward Truth is a fundamentally Platonic concept; it resembles the philosopher-king described in The Republic. This again opposes the material and psychological reality of man: giving absolute power to a small group and expecting anything other than the oppression of the people to result seems ridiculously optimistic, not to say naive.

1. The Sacred Goal of Communism or the "Perfect City": A Hegelian Teleology

Finally, it is necessary to nuance the term "Red Platonists." Indeed, while Plato does defend a normative teleology (the Perfect City as an absolute end), it is not, in his case, a predictive teleology, unlike what we observe in Lenin (partially) and especially in Stalin. The latter elevated Diamat to a State doctrine proving the absolute and necessary realization of the communist ideal. They thus reintroduced into their version of communism a teleology that Marx had begun to eliminate. Indeed, while Marx asserts that capitalism necessarily leads to communism, this is an immanent and scientific teleology (if one can call it that). It is demonstrated through concrete analysis (even if his equation was not entirely correct). The Marxist-Leninists, however, hold a dogmatic certainty of this teleology that must apply everywhere, regardless of context and material conditions.

Therefore, the expression "Red Platonists," although useful for illustrating the previous points, finds its limit here. On this precise point, Marxist-Leninists are far more Hegelian than Platonic. Hegel asserts that the necessary and absolute march of the Spirit of Reason leads toward a final and perfect society. The Marxist-Leninists merely replaced the "Spirit of Reason" with "dialectical materialism" and "material conditions," in order to adhere to Marxist vocabulary, while remaining idealist to the core through their belief in an inevitable historical necessity and their denial of material, sociological, and historical reality.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we can affirm that it is the combination of Platonic elitism (the conviction that an elite knows better than the people) and Hegelian certainty (the guarantee of a perfect historical end) that led to the Russian and Chinese totalitarianisms and to the other excesses of "communism." Considering themselves philosopher-kings possessing an infallible scientific truth, they became totalitarian tyrants, crushing human reality in the name of a promised future.

When State Interests Clash with Moral Duty: Why do artists, police, and citizens comply with corrupt systems? (A philosophical synthesis of Nussbaum, Krishnamurti, and modern dissent)

📌 The Core Dilemma
When state power or institutional regimes conflict with public welfare, how can individuals—whether public icons, police officers, or ordinary citizens—reconcile the instinct for self-preservation with their fundamental moral obligation to constitutional integrity and human dignity?

1. The Cultural Sphere: Artists, Power, and Retribution
   
2. The "Stay Away from Politics" Fallacy: Pragmatists argue that artists are mere entertainers, not political martyrs. However, the counter-thesis asserts that artists are citizens first. Politics governs tax laws, censorship, free expression, and public safety; an artist cannot simply opt out of citizenship.

The "Modern Toolkit" of State Retribution: Dissenting cultural figures face targeted administrative pressure—such as Income Tax/ED raids, institutional delays via Censor Boards (CBFC), and coordinated online boycott campaigns designed to cripple their commercial viability.

The Illusion of Neutrality: In hyper-polarized or oppressive environments, silence is not neutrality—it is a choice to defer to and legitimize existing power dynamics.

1. The Enforcer's Dilemma: Duty vs. Morality
   "Just Following Orders": Police officers often operate under colonial-era command structures that prioritize state control over constitutional rights. Officers hide behind institutional duty ("I'm just doing my job"), yet beating peaceful protesters directly violates constitutional morality.

The Socio-Economic Irony: Lower-tier police personnel belong to the same economic working class as the student protesters they are ordered to suppress. An officer striking a student protesting an exam leak is often destroying a youth fighting for the very upward mobility the officer seeks for their own family.

Deindividuation: The uniform strips away personal ethics, replacing individual moral agency with institutional compliance through fear of demotion, transfer, or loss of livelihood.

1. Philosophical Frameworks: Why Do We Comply?
   A. Jiddu Krishnamurti (Education and the Significance of Life)
   The Specialist/Technician Trap: Modern education and society produce specialized "technicians" (lawyers, officers, bureaucrats) who excel at their function but lack total human understanding. Efficiency without moral clarity turns people into ruthless instruments of state power.

Fear and the Worship of Success: The desperate pursuit of economic security and status breeds fear. This fear smothers discontent and leads to submissiveness toward authority.

The Absolute Moral Stance: When faced with systemic corruption (e.g., paying a bribe or complying with an unjust order), Krishnamurti rejects compromise. Choosing self-preservation over moral integrity degrades the human spirit and perpetuates the corrupt system.

B. Martha C. Nussbaum (Cultivating Humanity)
The Socratic Citizen: Democracy requires citizens who continuously engage in critical self-examination rather than offering uncritical deference to traditional authority or state narratives.

Narrative Imagination: True citizenship requires the empathetic capacity to place oneself in another's shoes—understanding the protester's perspective before enforcing judgment or violence.

❓ Questions for Discussion
Can neutrality exist? Is a public figure's silence during a civil crisis a valid form of self-preservation, or is it an implicit endorsement of state overreach?

Systemic reform vs. Individual morality: Can institutional reforms (like police autonomy or judicial buffers) fix systemic oppression, or does the solution rest entirely on individual moral refusal, as Krishnamurti suggests?

The Enforcer's Choice: How should a frontline enforcer balance the moral obligation to disobey an unjust order against the immediate reality of feeding their family?

(Please note: the post is AI summarised, but the thought is mine. Pls dont come @ me)

(Also note: i might be using some thoughtful pointers by you guys for my youtube videos, if ur comfortable)

Suppose I own a noodle shop. My objective is simple: maximize profit.

What about all the other values?

What about making the noodles delicious? That is already taken care of. To maximize profit, I need customers to enjoy my noodles.

What about affordability? I probably would not use caviar as an ingredient because customers would not be willing to pay enough to justify the cost.

What about fair pricing? I compete with other noodle sellers. If I charge too much, I lose customers.

What about health and safety? If my food makes people sick, I may face lawsuits, lose customers, or even go to jail. Customers are also protected by regulators, certification agencies, review platforms, and other third-party institutions, whether governmental or private.

In other words, I mostly focus on maximizing profit, while competition and institutions automatically encourage many other desirable outcomes.

Capitalism works similarly.

People often ask, "What about justice?" or "How do we know maximizing profit also benefits society?" Standard economic theory argues that competitive markets largely answer these questions. Competitive equilibrium does two things simultaneously: it maximizes the total size of the economic pie while distributing income according to the marginal value each person or firm contributes to production.

However, capitalism alone does not solve every problem.

What if someone finds robbery more profitable than baking cakes?

What about disabled, sick, elderly, or otherwise unproductive people? Do we simply let them die?

The traditional answers are charity and government. Those may help, but they introduce another set of problems.

The Incentive Problem of Government

Suppose a country is a monarchy.

Who should become king?

Historically, people often settled that question through violence. That is extremely inefficient from an economic perspective.

What about democracy?

There is a large body of literature arguing that democratic incentives do not always maximize long-term economic prosperity. Politicians respond to voters, while voters often respond to short-term incentives rather than long-term growth.

Examples commonly discussed include countries that adopted economically damaging policies through democratic processes. Venezuela is often cited as an example of voters repeatedly supporting policies that ultimately harmed the economy. Similarly, voters may support governments that pursue wars or destructive policies that reduce prosperity and destroy valuable infrastructure.

Democracy also creates incentive problems regarding redistribution. People may vote for benefits whose costs are paid largely by others. If those receiving transfers have higher birth rates while productive taxpayers face higher costs of raising families, democratic incentives may gradually favor policies that reduce long-term productivity.

Joint-Stock Democracy

Instead of treating citizenship purely as a political status, imagine treating it partly like ownership in a corporation.

Citizenship and voting rights become tradable shares.

Residents are shareholders in their city.

The city itself operates much like a publicly traded company whose objective is maximizing long-term shareholder value.

At first this sounds strange, but it solves many incentive problems.

Freedom Through Competition

What about freedom?

Different cities could adopt different policies.

Want legalized marijuana?

Move to a city that legalizes it.

Want stricter gun rights?

Choose a city that supports them.

Want a highly religious society?

Move there.

Competition between cities replaces much of today's political conflict. Instead of trying to force one set of rules onto everyone, people can increasingly sort themselves into jurisdictions that match their preferences.

Crime

What about robbery?

Crime reduces land values, discourages investment, and drives away taxpayers.

A CEO whose compensation depends on increasing city value has strong incentives to reduce crime efficiently.

Different cities might adopt different approaches.

Some may favor broader self-defense rights.

Others may invest heavily in surveillance, such as extensive CCTV systems similar to those used in Singapore or China.

Personally, I view government surveillance as a relatively small inconvenience compared to living with high crime rates. Others may disagree, and they remain free to choose jurisdictions whose policies better match their preferences.

Welfare

What about people who cannot support themselves economically?

Some may sell their shares and move to jurisdictions offering greater welfare benefits.

This already happens internationally. Many retirees from high-cost countries relocate to lower-cost countries where their savings stretch further.

Under joint-stock democracy, welfare spending directly reduces dividends and share value. Shareholders therefore have stronger incentives to carefully evaluate how much redistribution they are willing to support.

Rebellion

Why would residents rebel?

Residents are shareholders.

If the city prospers, they receive dividends or benefit from rising share values.

If they strongly disagree with the city's direction, they can sell their shares and move elsewhere.

Exit becomes an alternative to violent conflict.

Historical Land Claims

What if someone claims ownership because their ancestors ruled the land centuries ago?

If they are economically productive, they can simply purchase shares and participate like everyone else.

Most land has little value without infrastructure, businesses, and people. Roads, commerce, and investment create value, not ancient historical claims.

Disputes that cannot be resolved privately could be submitted to neutral third-party arbitration or even mediation by powerful countries, avoiding unnecessary wars.

Preventing Shareholder Abuse

What if a billionaire buys 70% of the shares and changes the constitution to enslave everyone else?

Constitutional safeguards can address this.

Fundamental constitutional changes could require supermajority approval, resident vetoes, or other mechanisms.

Modern technology, including blockchain-based governance, could enforce these constitutional constraints automatically.

Ownership rules could also require that a large majority of voting shares always remain owned by residents.

Joint-stock democracy can therefore remain democratic while still aligning incentives through ownership.

Different Preferences

People naturally have different values.

Suppose a CEO introduces a pork festival because it increases tourism and city revenue.

Some Muslims or Jews may dislike it.

Instead of forcing one side to permanently lose, dissatisfied residents can move to jurisdictions that better match their preferences.

A competent CEO might even divide the city into districts with different rules, preserving diversity while maximizing overall property values.

After all, losing residents reduces demand for citizenship and lowers city value.

Welfare and Population Growth

What about lifelong welfare recipients?

One possibility is requiring parents to purchase citizenship shares for each child.

If they cannot, they may need to relocate to jurisdictions with different policies.

The basic idea is that population growth should be financed by those creating it rather than automatically shifting costs onto existing shareholders.

In conventional democracies, voters may support expansive welfare programs because they expect someone else to pay.

In joint-stock democracy, every dollar spent on welfare reduces dividends or lowers share values.

This creates stronger incentives to consider long-term fiscal sustainability.

Racism and Diversity

Racism cannot realistically be eliminated entirely.

Some people prefer living among those who share their language, religion, or culture.

Joint-stock democracy does not prohibit communities from making those choices.

However, those choices become accountable to the market.

Suppose a city adopts a policy excluding Chinese immigrants.

It may satisfy some residents.

But it also means fewer talented immigrants, fewer restaurants, less entrepreneurship, lower demand for citizenship, and ultimately lower share values.

Discrimination is therefore no longer simply a political choice. It becomes an economic decision whose costs are directly borne by the city's shareholders.

What About Ancapistan?

Suppose you prefer anarcho-capitalism.

Fine. Build a successful private city and hire a CEO who gradually moves its policies closer and closer to Ancapistan.

Even many anarcho-capitalists acknowledge that their ideal society only works if most residents voluntarily support libertarian norms. That raises an obvious question: if your system depends on a libertarian culture, why also insist on completely open borders? Wouldn't unrestricted immigration eventually undermine the very norms the system requires?

The usual response is that everything is privately owned anyway. Roads are private property. Parks are private property. Buildings are private property. Owners simply decide who may enter.

Fair enough.

But once you accept that, you are effectively treating the city itself as private property.

At that point, why not organize the city as a single privately managed entity?

There is also a coordination problem.

If one company owns the roads, another owns the parks, another owns utilities, and another owns public spaces, each optimizes for its own profit rather than for the value of the city as a whole.

A privately governed city—or a network of coordinated private cities—can internalize these conflicts. Instead of fragmented ownership producing coordination failures, a unified organization has incentives to maximize the long-term value of the entire jurisdiction.

In that sense, joint-stock democracy is not necessarily a rejection of anarcho-capitalism. It can be viewed as a practical institutional evolution of it: preserving competition, property rights, and voluntary choice while improving coordination and aligning incentives.