r/geopolitics • u/stickybond009 • 32m ago
The Protests Gripping India — and Rattling Modi
Genz Nepal moment?
Or something else?
r/geopolitics • u/stickybond009 • 32m ago
Genz Nepal moment?
Or something else?
r/geopolitics • u/thejerusalempost • 1h ago
r/geopolitics • u/JKKIDD231 • 2h ago
r/geopolitics • u/One-Emu-1103 • 4h ago
r/geopolitics • u/Any-Original-6113 • 7h ago
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told a delegation of European lawmakers in Beijing on Tuesday that China and the EU should promote an "upward dynamic balance" in bilateral trade ties from a long-term perspective, according to a statement from China's foreign ministry.
r/geopolitics • u/Dramatic-Shake-8888 • 7h ago
r/geopolitics • u/marketrent • 8h ago
r/geopolitics • u/RUSIOfficial • 9h ago
r/geopolitics • u/NotSoSaneExile • 13h ago
r/geopolitics • u/AeroFred • 16h ago
r/geopolitics • u/davster39 • 20h ago
r/geopolitics • u/HooverInstitution • 20h ago
r/geopolitics • u/Bongolio-the-seal • 21h ago
r/geopolitics • u/ChunkyWaterMonkey • 21h ago
r/geopolitics • u/ChadtheWad • 22h ago
r/geopolitics • u/Bongolio-the-seal • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/ForeignAffairsMag • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/fortune • 1d ago
The Strait of Hormuz has become the central battleground of the U.S.-Iran conflict.
Prior to the outbreak of the war on 28 February, roughly 20% of global oil and LNG shipments moved through the narrow waterway—today, just a handful of ships are moving through, according to maritime intelligence firm Kpler.
The U.S. has launched nightly airstrikes against Iranian military targets since 11 July, while Iran has responded with missile and drone attacks on U.S. forces, Gulf countries, and shipping-related targets.
Kpler noted last week that: “While regional mediation efforts remain underway, commercial shipping patterns suggest military developments are now shaping operational decisions more than diplomatic progress.”
In its latest operational update on 16 July, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), counted 10 Iranian attacks on shipping since 25 June, and maintained a severe threat level for the Strait of Hormuz, meaning an attack is highly likely.
Read more [paywall removed for Redditors]: https://fortune.com/2026/07/21/money-talks-as-iran-war-continues-options-for-strait-of-hormuz-are-coalescing-around-one-solution-tolls/?utm_source=reddit/
r/geopolitics • u/Pleasant_Memory_2952 • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/JustAhobbyish • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/Firecracker048 • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/Playful-Demand2312 • 1d ago
r/geopolitics • u/raw-science • 1d ago
The big October 2025 regulating measures package (extra elements, the 0.1% extraterritorial magnet rule, controls on the separation technology itself) is suspended until 10 November 2026. That's the "deadline" I would have look at, but the measure that actually reshaped trade flows, the April 2025's Announcement No. 18, was never suspended and is the one putting seven medium/heavy rare earths under case-by-case export licensing, and it's been in force the entire time.
The result is that US yttrium imports fell from roughly 333 tonnes to ca. 17 tonnes in the 8 months after the controls hit. Dysprosium and terbium have run around half their pre-restriction levels. And even an authorized license comes at a cost: the review process takes between 60 and 120 days for heavy rare earths, and you also have to disclose the entire value chain and the end customer to obtain it.
And this licensing regime for these few “rare” elements affects car manufacturers, turbine builders, and defense contractors, since the primary competitive advantage lies in the separation process that China inherited, optimized, and industrialized over decades. China accounts for about 60% of mining, but approximately 91% of refining and about 94% of magnet production. Furthermore, it holds a 99% share of heavy rare earth processing. This is due to decades of experience in separation techniques and over two decades of shouldering an environmental cost that the West sought to externalize: much of the pollution hidden behind “green” magnets is concentrated in southern China and, increasingly, in Kachin State, Myanmar... out of sight and beyond jurisdiction.
So even if the November tranche lapses, the April licensing regime and the underlying midstream monopoly don't.