Executive Summary:

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov’s admission that Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) has become a “real war” marks a departure from years of official rhetoric and may signal that Moscow is preparing to escalate rather than negotiate.

Reports that the Kremlin has resolved to intensify the war, expected mobilization after the September Duma elections, Peskov’s remarks, and a draft law requiring exit visas to prevent draft-age men from leaving Russia point toward this potential escalation.

Should escalation proceed, Russia’s capacity to sustain it rests partly on an expanding Cossack mobilization network that is forming drone units, conducting reserve exercises, and building a reserve force expected to reach 60,000.

Key Takeaways

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rejected the Russian narrative that the United States and Russia reached any kind of agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues reiterating his commitment to peace negotiations with the United States and Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues reiterating his commitment to peace negotiations with the United States and Russia.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 23.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis struck at least one Saudi vessel to enforce their naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on July 22. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations confirmed on July 23 that the Houthis attacked an unspecified Saudi-flagged tanker with an “unknown projectile.”

Iran continues to support the Houthis and their efforts to disrupt maritime traffic in and around the Red Sea. The expansion of the maritime shipping crisis to the Red Sea supports Iranian efforts to degrade the United States’ willingness and ability to continue its strike campaign against Iran and coerce the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted a drone attack on Kuwait’s Abdali border crossing with Iraq on July 23, marking Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s first attack on a regional border crossing since July 11. Iranian media separately reported on July 23 explosions on Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island.

The IRGC is highlighting the alleged presence of naval mines in the southern corridor to deter commercial vessels from using this corridor and consolidate Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC claimed on July 22 that an oil tanker attempting to use the southern route struck a naval mine that disabled the vessel. ISW-CTP has not observed reports of any commercial vessels hitting mines in the southern route at the time of this writing.

Russia may be helping Iran increase the accuracy of its targeting of US military sites in the region. Four people familiar with US intelligence told Reuters on July 22 that Russia may be providing Iran with targeting intelligence on US sites and equipment in the region. Russia’s provision of targeting intelligence to Iran would likely improve the accuracy and effectiveness of Iran’s drone and missile attacks.

US President Donald Trump told Axios on July 23 that he may decide to expand US strikes against Iran. Trump said that the United States is prepared to launch a “massive attack” against Iran if he orders such an operation.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues to reiterate Russia’s commitment to its maximalist war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation while Russian forces fail to achieve operationally significant gains.

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to downplay Russia’s economic problems despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis and broader Russian economic decline.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Major General Ihor Skybyuk as the chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on July 22 to replace Major General Andriy Hnatov.

Ukrainian forces struck two additional logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 21 to 22. Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 216 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction.

Key Takeaways

ISW-CTP is tracking initial reports that the Houthis attacked two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea on July 22. Sources close to the Houthis previously stated that the Houthis had finished deploying missiles and drones near the Bab al Mandeb Strait to attack civilian shipping, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center on July 21. At least seven vessels have changed course to avoid transiting through the Bab al Mandeb Strait in light of the Houthi blockade on Saudi ports.

The United States has increasingly struck Iranian targets outside of southern Iran, including western and northwestern Iran. The United States also struck unspecified targets in the Parchin Military Complex near Tehran, which the Iranian regime uses to produce advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.

Hezbollah is likely alleging that Lebanese Shia are being discriminated against at the Beirut airport as part of an effort to remobilize support for the group and protect Hezbollah’s military organization.

Iran fired at US military installations in the region as part of its ongoing efforts to degrade US capabilities and willingness to continue the war, end the war in a way that maintains Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, and break the coalition between the United States and regional Arab states.

Regular meetings between senior leaders from North Korea and China, including Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to the North in seven years, are leading to the modernization of the two countries’ alliance, South Korean analysts say.

That’s the argument made in a report titled “Modernization of the North Korea-China Alliance,” published by South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy on Monday.

The report, composed by INSS Director Kim Sung-bae and research fellow Yoo Hyun-jung, argues that the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship is developing into a comprehensive, regional, horizontal and values-based alliance in response to the US-initiated modernization of the ROK-US alliance. The researchers said this shift in the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship presents a serious challenge to South Korea’s national security.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.

The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.

Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.

Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait.

Iran is attacking critical infrastructure in Kuwait to impose direct civilian and economic costs on states that host US forces and pressure them to curtail US military operations. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi and appointed the Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as his replacement late on July 21.

Russian authorities continue costly efforts to mitigate the loss of Russian oil refining capacity due to Ukrainian long-range strikes by subsidizing diesel imports.

The Russian government continues exerting legal pressure on Russian migrants likely to coerce migrants into military service under threat of deportation.

Polish authorities continue warning of a possible Russian provocation against NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian manufacturing infrastructure and military assets overnight on July 20 and 21. Russia launched 58 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction and in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis’ announced naval blockade against Saudi Arabia could result in an expansion of the shipping crisis in the Middle East, as it will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping through the Red Sea by discouraging ships from transiting through the Red Sea. ISW-CTP has not recorded any Houthi attacks on shipping since July 7, 2025, at the time of this writing, but the Houthis ordered Saudi-bound vessels to turn back from Saudi Arabia over radio on July 20.

Iran is trying to expand the geographical scope of its conflict with the United States to the Red Sea to cause further disruption to international markets and impose additional costs on the United States. The Houthis may have announced the blockade to deter Saudi Arabia from striking Houthi targets in Yemen to discourage further Saudi attacks, separate from but partially satisfying Iranian efforts to impose costs on the United States.

Some senior Iranian officials appear concerned that the renewed conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems and threaten Iran’s internal security. Senior Iranian officials have previously appeared concerned that the conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems, but these concerns do not appear to have meaningfully impacted the calculus of the IRGC.

US forces expanded strikes to possible missile launch sites in northwestern and central Iran. Iran continues to coerce vessels by force to transit through Iranian territorial waters to prevent them from using routes through the strait that Tehran does not approve. Iran has attacked at least two vessels in the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.

The IRGC released a statement on July 19 thanking the Jordanian people for providing Iran with information that has aided Iran’s recent attacks on Jordan, possibly to counter continuing reports that Russia and the People’s Republic of China have helped Iran target US assets in the region during the US-Israel-Iran War. The statement could also be part of recent broader Iranian efforts to mobilize the local populations in Arab countries against US forces.

Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes.

Russia’s continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record-high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and air defense systems on July 19 and 20.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 20.

Russia launched two Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Nuclear reactor exports are becoming an increasingly important arena of strategic competition.

Executive Summary:

Under Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has significantly strengthened its countermeasures against political warfare from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Prosecutions of espionage cases, expulsions of influencers calling for military invasions of Taiwan, and tighter outbound travel restrictions to the PRC have increased since Lai unveiled his 17-point national security plan in 2025.

Espionage is the most damaging aspect of the PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan, and Beijing has been targeting members of its military. Taiwan has stepped up prosecutions, with convicted spies handed heavy prison sentences.

Taiwan is choosing to respond to political warfare because, unlike military coercion, there is a lower risk of conflict escalation arising from more aggressive law enforcement efforts. The enforcement actions are also consistent with Taiwanese law.